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Identifying the Liquidity




t is widely believed that the Fed controls the
overnight federal funds rate, and thereby other
short-term interest rates, through open market
operations.1 The Fed sells government securities,
reducing the supply of reserves relative to demand,
when it wants to raise the funds rate. Similarly, it
purchases securities when it wants the funds rate
to fall. The change in the short-term interest rates
brought about by the exogenous policy actions
of the monetary authority is referred to as the
liquidity effect. By many accounts—public and
professional—the Fed’s use of this procedure is
responsible for most, if not all, lower frequency
variation in the federal funds rate and, thereby,
other short-term interest rates at least since the
late 1980s.
Despite the widespread belief in the Fed’s ability
to control short-term interest rates through open
market operations, attempts to estimate the liquid-
ity effect—using a variety of approaches—generally
have been unsuccessful.2 Many analysts attribute
this lack of success to the inability of economists
to isolate the exogenous policy actions of the Fed.
Hamilton (1997) notes that, most often, the Fed
adjusts its policy instrument in response to new
information about current or future values of out-
put, inflation, the exchange rate, or other variables.
Because of this, Hamilton argues that “the correla-
tion between such ‘policy innovations’ and the
future level of output of necessity mixes together
the effect of policy on output with the effect of out-
put on policy” (p. 80). This problem tends to be
more severe when the monetary aggregates used to
estimate the liquidity effect are only loosely associ-
ated with the policy actions of the Fed or when the
data are averaged over a period of a month or more.
Hamilton suggests that “a more convincing
measure of the liquidity effect” can be obtained by
estimating the “instantaneous consequences of an
open market purchase. For daily data, Federal
Reserve accounting and Trading Desk procedures
suggest some quite plausible identifying assump-
tions that can be used to measure the instantaneous
liquidity effect” (pp. 80-81). Specifically, Hamilton
estimates the response of the funds rate to reserve
supply shocks that are analogous to those that the
Fed could create through open market operations.
Hamilton finds that the funds rate responds signifi-
cantly to reserve supply shocks, but only on the
last two days of the maintenance period, and that
the response is economically significant only on
settlement Wednesdays.
I model the reserve market based on the Fed’s
operating procedure and show why the liquidity
effect cannot be identified using Hamilton’s method-
ology. Consistent with this analysis, I show that
Hamilton’s settlement-day result is fragile and due
to a few settlement Wednesdays when there were
unusually large changes in the funds rate. In addi-
tion, I show that there is no liquidity effect using
his methodology for sample periods before and
after his.
I then suggest an alternative approach to esti-
mating the liquidity effect at the daily frequency.
Specifically, I argue that the liquidity effect can be
identified by estimating the change in nonborrowed
reserves associated with changes in the Fed’s target
for the federal funds rate. If the Fed controls the
federal funds rate by changing the funds rate target,
reserves should change when the target is changed.
Estimates of this model using data prior to 1994
suggest that, while the Fed undertakes open market
operations consistent with changing the funds rate
when the funds rate target is changed, the size of the
actions is relatively small compared with stochastic
fluctuations in reserves. One possible interpretation
1 It is arguably the case that the Federal Reserve has implemented
monetary policy by targeting the short-term interest rates, particularly
the federal funds rate, during much of its history (Goodfriend,1991).
2 Some analysts like Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997, 1996,
1994), Pagan and Robertson (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1997a, b),
and Strongin (1995) have suggested that policy actions can be identi-
fied using innovations from nonborrowed reserves in the context of
a structural VAR; however, Thornton (1999b) has shown innovations
to nonborrowed reserves from these models are not measures of Fed
policy actions. In a similar vein, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims
(1992) have suggested that policy actions of the Fed could be measured
by innovations to the federal funds rate in the context of a VAR. How-
ever, the deviations from the Fed’s funds rate target, which these
measures capture, are better interpreted as random variation or control
errors rather than policy innovations. Changes in the Fed’s funds rate
target occur less frequently and are more erratic than such innovations.
Moreover, evidence suggests that the funds rate adapts quickly to the
new target level.
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of the results is that the Fed undertakes such actions
to signal target changes. Additional evidence is pre-
sented that is inconsistent with this explanation,
however.
THE LIQUIDITY EFFECT
The idea that an exogenous central bank–
engineered increase in the nominal money stock
can temporarily reduce interest rates is fundamental
to most analyses of monetary policy. The liquidity
effect has classical roots (e.g., Patinkin, 1965, and
Humphrey, 1983b). Classical economists believed
that an exogenous increase in the supply of money
would increase the supply of loanable funds, causing
the interest rate to fall.3 Ultimately, however, prices
would rise and the interest rate would return to the
previous level.4 While the real/nominal interest rate
taxonomy is usually attributed to Fisher (1907),
Humphrey (1983a) argues that classical economists
from Thornton ([1802] 1939) on understood the
distinction between real and nominal interest rates.
Indeed, Thornton (p. 255) argues that the interest
rate can be kept below its natural level only by
continually increasing the money supply and ever
rising prices.
Despite its long history in monetary economics,
it appears that the phrase liquidity effect was first
used publicly by Milton Friedman in a speech at
the 1968 Conference on Savings and Residential
Financing sponsored by the United States Savings
and Loan League (Friedman, 1969).5 For Friedman,
the liquidity effect was a natural extension of
Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference. Specifically,
Friedman (1969, p. 365) notes that the “liquidity
effect in simplest form is the usual textbook rela-
tionship between the quantity of money and the
interest rate which says that the larger the quantity
of money, the lower the interest rate will have to be
to induce people to hold it.”
Like his classical ancestors, Friedman saw the
liquidity effect as the first of three possible effects
associated with an exogenous change in the money
supply.6 Friedman considered two cases. The first
was a once-and-for-all central bank–engineered
increase in the supply of money. An increase in the
money stock causes the supply of real money bal-
ances to increase relative to demand at the current
price level. Because of an implicit assumption that
prices and output would be slow to adjust to the
central bank’s action, Friedman argued that initially
interest rates would fall—there would be a liquidity
effect. The increase in the real money stock coupled
with the decline in interest rates would cause prices
and/or output to rise until the supply and demand
for real money balances were once again equal.
While the path to equilibrium depended on the
relative response of output and prices, Friedman
assumed that money was neutral. Eventually the
price level would rise to restore real money balances
to their previous level.
Friedman’s second experiment was dynamic.
Specifically, he assumed that there was “an unan-
ticipated jump in the rate of monetary increase”
(1976, p. 367). In this case there is a third effect,
which Friedman called the price anticipation
effect. Faster money growth would give rise to an
increase in inflation and a corresponding rise in
expectations for inflation. Eventually, equilibrium
would be achieved at a high nominal interest rate
and an unchanged real rate. Like Thornton ([1802]
1939), Friedman (1968, p. 6) argued that the rate
could be kept below its natural level only with ever-
accelerating money growth.7
3 Some classical economists, e.g., Ricardo, believed that the effect of
money on the interest rate was inconsequential, see Humphrey
(1983b) for more details.
4 In the case of Thornton ([1802] 1939) and Ricardo, this effect worked
through the demand side. In the case of Wicksell, the effect was
through the supply side, reducing the equilibrium stock of real money
as the price level rose (see Patinkin, 1965, pp. 369-70).
5 The phrase liquidity effect appears to have first appeared in print in
William Gibson’s (1967) dissertation. Gibson was a student of Milton
Friedman, and Bob Hetzel tells me that Friedman used the phrase in
his monetary economics class in the early to mid 1960s. Hence, it
seems likely that Gibson was merely using a phrase that Friedman
had coined. Gibson’s dissertation appeared as a Board of Governors
Staff Economic Study and was subsequently published in the Journal
of Political Economy (Gibson, 1970). Neither Friedman nor Gibson
presented the phrase as their own and, in personal correspondence,
Friedman noted that “liquidity played such an important role in
Keynes’s General Theory and liquidity preference became a common
term after The General Theory came out [so that] if you asked me, it
would have never occurred to me that I was the first person to intro-
duce the term.” Nelson (1996) also traces the use of the phrase to
Friedman.
6 Friedman (1969) acknowledged the liquidity effect’s classical origins
by pointing out that John Stuart Mill had noted this “first-round” effect
of a change in the quantity of money, indicating that Mill argued that
the effect would be different if it occurred through the production of
gold or through the credit market. In the former case, the initial effect
would be on the wages of gold miners and the prices of commodities
they consumed; in the latter case, it would be on the interest rate.
7 Despite its long tradition of being associated with the demand for
money and credit, some economists (e.g., Ohanian and Stockman,
1995, and Christiano, 1991) have suggested there can be a liquidity
effect in models that completely abstract from money and the financial
markets. Hoover (1995, p. 30) has noted, however, that such models
do not seem to “capture our intuitive understanding of the liquidity
effect,” suggesting that “in all of these models—including even the
basic IS-LM model with a vertical LM curve—the liquidity effect seems
to operate through the wrong mechanism.”FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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A MODEL OF THE RESERVE MARKET
AND THE FED’S OPERATING 
PROCEDURE
The idea that the liquidity effect is inexorably
linked to the interest elasticity of money demand is
extended to the market for reserves. Until recently,
the demand for total reserves, TR, was determined
in large part by reserve requirements imposed on
banks by the Fed.8 Specifically, banks are required
to maintain reserves (vault cash and deposits at the
Fed) equal to some proportion, τ, 0<τ<1, of their
reservable deposit liabilities, which make up a large
portion of the supply of money. Hence, the demand
for reserves is given by 
(1) .
The demand for reservable transaction deposits is
denoted by f(i,x), which is a function of the public’s
opportunity cost of holding transaction deposits, it,
and a vector of other variables that determine the
demand for transaction deposits, xt, and a random
demand shock, vt.
The demand for excess reserves is not well
defined within the maintenance period because
banks are free to alter their reserve holdings within
the maintenance period so long as they hold
enough reserves on a daily average basis to meet
their requirement. Excess reserves become
increasingly meaningful as the maintenance peri-
ods draws to a close.
Because reserves are non-interest bearing, these
banks must derive an implicit benefit from holding
excess reserves, ERt, that is greater than or equal to
the opportunity cost of holding them. If banks are
holding excess reserves up to the point where the
marginal benefit from the last dollar of excess
reserves held is equal to the opportunity cost of
holding it, one would expect the demand for excess
reserves to be sensitive to changes in the interest
rate. Indeed, some (e.g., Hamilton, 1998) model the
demand for excess reserves in this manner. Never-
theless, banks’ holdings of excess reserves are rather
insensitive to changes in interest rates at a mainte-
nance period frequency. One possible reason is that
excess reserves are primarily held by relatively small
banks that do not monitor their reserve positions
closely. Hence, even if the concept of the daily
demand for excess reserves were meaningful, day-
to-day fluctuations in excess reserves would likely
be unpredictable.
TR f i x v ER t
d
tt t t
d =+ + τ[(, ) ]
Consequently, the demand for excess reserves
is assumed to have the form
(2) ,
where ϑ is constant and χt is an i.i.d. random distur-
bance. One could think of ϑ as the maintenance-
period average demand for excess reserves. While
this assumption is simple, it has no important
consequences for identifying the liquidity effect
because, as was noted earlier, the liquidity effect
depends on the demand for money and not banks’
demand for excess reserves.
The quantity of total reserves that the Fed sup-
plies is determined by the Fed’s holding of govern-
ment securities, Bt, borrowed reserves, BRt, and all
other factors that affect reserve supply, Ft—primarily
Treasury balances at the Fed and the float. That is, 
(3) .
The quantity of reserves that the Fed supplies each
day is determined by its operating procedure.
According to Feinman (1993, p. 234), the Fed’s
current federal funds rate targeting procedure is
as follows:
Each day the staff estimates the period-
average demand for reserves by projecting
required reserves against deposits and the
desired excess reserves of the banking sys-
tem. Subtracting the FOMC-specified level
of discount window borrowing from this
forecast of reserve demand yields the non-
borrowed reserve path, the Desk’s prime
objective. Each morning the staff’s forecast
of nonborrowed reserves owing to market
factors beyond the Fed’s control (for exam-
ple, Treasury balances at the Fed, float, etc.)
is subtracted from the path to produce an
estimate of the quantity of reserves that
must be added or subtracted, on a period-
average basis, to reach the objective.
The Fed’s projected level of government securi-
TR B BR F t
s




8 Reserve requirements once applied to all but the currency compo-
nent of M1. Over time, however, reserve requirements have encom-
passed a smaller proportion of M1 balances. Indeed, today a large
portion of banks maintain deposits with the Fed, not to meet reserve
requirements, but to process transactions on FedWire. Since the advent
of “sweep” programs in 1994 (designed to reduce the effect of the
reserve tax), the demand for deposits at the Fed increasingly has
been determined by banks’ demand for Fed services (see Anderson
and Rasche, 2001).62 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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where Et–1 denotes the expectation operator condi-
tional on information up to the start of the day, FF*
t
denotes the Fed’s target for the federal funds rate on
day t, and BRASt denotes the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee’s (FOMC’s) borrowed reserves
assumption.9
When Bt is larger than B*
t, the operating proce-
dure indicates a need to drain reserves. When Bt is
smaller than B*
t, there is a need to add reserves. The
quantity of reserves available each maintenance
period is equal to the reserves supplied in accor-
dance with the operating procedure, B*
t, plus the
actual level of borrowing and the level of all other






If the Desk follows this rule precisely, the amount
of reserves available each day is equal to the Fed’s
forecast of reserve demand plus the unexpected
components of the other factors that affect reserve
supply—BRt and Ft.
To close the model and derive the reduced form,
several additional assumptions are necessary. Fol-
lowing Hamilton (1997), I assume that the demand
for reservable deposits is
(7)
and that the opportunity cost rate is the federal
funds rate, i.e., it≡FFt.10 I also assume that bank
borrowing is a function of the spread between the
federal funds rate and the discount rate and other
factors. Specifically, I assume that
(8) ,
where DR denotes the Federal Reserve’s discount
rate and η represents all other factors that determine
bank borrowing. For simplicity, I assume the process
generating Ft is mean stationary, i.e., Ft=µ+ωt, and
that the Fed makes unbiased forecasts of Ft, i.e.,
Et–1Ft=µ.
BR FF DR tt t t =− + αη ()
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The official BRASt changed infrequently; how-
ever, I have shown elsewhere (Thornton, 2001a) that
the Desk has frequently offset changes in borrow-
ing at the maintenance-period frequency. Given its
practice of entering the market once per day in the
morning, the Fed cannot offset borrowing at the
daily frequency. Hence, I assume that the Desk oper-
ates to offset a proportion, ξ, 0≤ξ≤1, of expected
borrowing, i.e., 
(9) .
The value of ξ is a choice variable for the Desk. In
the steady state the funds rate equals the funds rate
target on average only if ξ=1. Hence, if the objec-
tive is to keep the funds rate close to the funds rate
target, the Desk has an incentive to completely off-
set expected borrowing.11 Because the Desk has a
strong incentive to offset borrowing, and there is
evidence that it has done so at the maintenance
period frequency, I impose the restriction ξ=1.
The reduced-form for the federal funds rate,




Note that the equilibrium funds rate equals the
Fed’s funds rate target on average so long as the Desk
makes unbiased forecasts of the demand for reserv-
FF FF x E x v
TR FF E x x
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9 Before June 1995, the borrowed reserves assumption was implicitly
set by the FOMC in that it was embedded in the policy alternatives
that the FOMC voted on at each meeting. The borrowed reserves
assumption was changed frequently during the intermeeting period,
however. Beginning with the June 30, 1995, meeting, the FOMC
dropped the explicit reference to the level of seasonal plus adjustment
borrowing that it believed was consistent with various policy alterna-
tives being considered.
10 Strictly speaking, this cannot be the case since individuals cannot par-
ticipate in the federal funds market. In most monetary policy discus-
sions, the opportunity cost rate is assumed to be linked to the funds
rate by the expectations theory of the term structure (e.g., Goodfriend,
1991; Balduzzi, Bertola, and Foresi, 1997; and Cook and Hahn, 1989).
11 See Thornton (2001a) for an analysis of why the Fed has an incentive
to offset borrowing completely under other operating procedures, such
as nonborrowed reserves targeting to maintain the stock of money at
the target level.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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able deposits. Positive shocks to the demand for
reservable deposits or excess reserves will cause the
funds rate to rise relative to the target, while positive
shocks to borrowing or other supply factors will
cause the equilibrium funds rate to fall. The amount
by which the Desk must change nonborrowed
reserves to change the funds rate target by one per-
centage point is –(τλ+α), which is larger than the
amount of the change in total reserves because of
the restriction that the Desk completely offsets bor-
rowing on average. If, on the other hand, ξ were zero,
the change in total reserves would be larger than
the change in nonborrowed reserves because the
change in the equilibrium funds rate would result
in a change in borrowing and, hence, total reserves.
THE RESERVE MARKET MODEL AND
THE LIQUIDITY EFFECT
Hamilton (1997) has suggested that the liquidity
effect can be estimated at the daily frequency by
estimating the response of the funds rate to a shock
to the supply of reserves analogous to the shocks
the Fed could create through exogenous open mar-
ket operations. It is important to emphasize that, in
private correspondence, Hamilton indicates that he
thinks of the daily liquidity effect “as arising from
(a) banks’ unwillingness to borrow from the dis-
count window unless the cost of fed funds is suffi-
ciently high, and (b) banks’ reluctance to reduce
excess reserves unless the cost of fed funds is suf-
ficiently high, not (c) the response of required
reserves to interest-sensitive transactions deposits.”12
He noted that the effect could not come through (c)
because the value of transaction deposits would not
respond within the day to changes in the interest
rate. I am sympathetic to the third point, but this is
tantamount to arguing that the liquidity effect—as
traditionally defined here—cannot be estimated
directly using daily data.
With these caveats, I used Hamilton’s model to
discuss the problems with identifying the liquidity
effect at the daily frequency using his approach.
Specifically, Hamilton assumes that the demand
for nonborrowed reserves is given by 
(11) ,
where Xt denotes a vector of predetermined vari-
ables. Hamilton notes that λ
∼
cannot be estimated
from the conditional expectation of equation (11)
because the Fed “actively chooses the supply of
reserves each day in response to the value of the
federal funds rate it anticipates for that day…”
NBR FF X t
d
tt t =− + ′ + ˜ ˜ λγ υ
(1997, p. 82). Rather than deriving a structural
model of the supply of reserves based on the Fed’s
operating procedure, Hamilton assumes that the
supply of nonborrowed reserves is given by
(12) .
Noting that the classic solution to this problem
of simultaneous equation bias is to find an instru-
ment that is correlated with NBRt but not with υt,
Hamilton argues that it is not necessary to identify
policy innovations, per se, as is usually done, in
order to estimate the liquidity effect. Specifically,
he suggests that the liquidity effect can be esti-
mated by estimating the error the Fed makes in
forecasting the Treasury balance each day. That
these forecast errors are uncorrelated with shocks
to money demand is evident from equation (10). 
Hamilton exploits the instrumental variable
approach by estimating the reduced form, derived
















the “error that the Fed makes in forecasting the
Treasury balance” (1997, p. 82). Hamilton observes
estimates of λ
∼
can be inferred from estimates of π









t, then consistent estimates of
π and ρ, and, hence, λ
∼
can be obtained.13
Shocks to the Treasury’s Balance and
the Liquidity Effect
Note that this approach does not eliminate the
identification problem, but replaces one identifica-














ρε ζ ε ,
NBR FF X t
s
tt t =+ ′ + ˜ ˜˜ δψ χ
12 Hamilton (1997) is not specific about the source of the liquidity effect,
stating only that it depends on the demand for reserves. Hamilton
(1998) is much more specific in modeling the demand for borrowed
and excess reserves.
13 Note that this condition need not hold for several reasons. For exam-
ple, an interruption to the transportation system could cause both
Treasury balances and the float to change from the Fed’s expectation.
See Thornton (2001b) for other reasons.
14 In addition, equation (10) shows that the coefficient implied by the
ratio of the estimated coefficients on ωt from the reduced-form of
nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate is (τλ+α) and not
τλ. This difference should be relatively unimportant over Hamilton’s
sample period because borrowing was relatively small and interest
insensitive, i.e., α is small (Thornton, 2001a).64 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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approach requires one to identify the “error that
the Fed makes in forecasting the Treasury balance.”
Failure to correctly identify the Treasury balance
component of ωt will bias the estimate of the
response to the funds rate.15 
Evidence that Hamilton failed to correctly iden-
tify the Fed’s forecast errors comes from noting in
his nonborrowed reserves equation that his estimate
of the coefficient on ε ˆU
t, –0.42, is considerably differ-
ent from the theoretically correct value of –1. It turns
out that Hamilton’s forecasts differ significantly
from those used each day to implement monetary
policy. Elsewhere (Thornton, 2001b), I evaluate the
forecasts of the Treasury’s balance made each day
by the New York Fed, the Treasury, and the Board
of Governors.16 A comparison of these forecasts
with those from Hamilton’s model shows that
model-based forecast errors are significantly larger
than those made by these agencies each day.
To see why this approach cannot identify the
liquidity effect, note the Fed’s system of reserve
requirements is not strictly contemporaneous.17
Instead, banks are required to maintain reserves
over a two-week period ending Wednesday based
on the average deposit liabilities held over a two-
week period ending Monday, two days previous.18
Specifically, banks must satisfy the condition
(14)
on the last day of the maintenance period.
Because the demand for reserves to satisfy
reserve requirements is completely determined by
Monday, the quantity of transaction deposits cannot
respond to the federal funds rate on the last two
days of the maintenance period. Since estimating
the slope of this demand curve is critical to estimat-
ing the liquidity effect, it is impossible to estimate
the liquidity effect on the last two days of the main-
tenance period.
If Hamilton’s settlement-day response is not due
to the liquidity effect, what accounts for it? There
are a couple of possibilities. First, equation (14)
shows that a reserve-supply shock that occurs on
any day during the maintenance period—including
settlement Wednesdays—contributes to only one-
fourteenth of the aggregate average imbalance at
the end of the maintenance period. Consequently,
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it would take a $14 billion error in forecasting the
Treasury’s balance to produce a $1 billion aggregate
reserve imbalance at the end of the maintenance
period. Hence, it could be that there are several very
large forecast errors that caused the funds rate to
move significantly on a few settlement days.
Second, unusually large changes in the funds
rate tend to occur more frequently on settlement
Wednesdays.19 Consequently, a few unusually large
settlement-Wednesday changes in the funds rate
could occur on days when Hamilton estimates that
there were relatively large shocks to the Treasury’s
balance.20 If either of these explanations is correct,
Hamilton’s settlement-Wednesday results should
be fragile, resulting from a relatively few settlement
Wednesdays when there are either very large
reserve-supply shocks or relatively large changes
in the funds rate.
15 There are two reasons for this. First, and most important, the Desk’s
decisions are based on its forecast of the Treasury’s balance. If esti-
mates used are not equal to the true estimates, the forecast errors
must be correlated with other factors that affect the supply of reserves.
Second, there could be a scale problem. For example, assume that
estimates of ε ˆU
t are twice as large on average as the true forecast errors
made by the Desk. In this case, the estimated response would be half
as large as the true response. 
16 That Hamilton’s forecast errors do not coincide with those made by the
Desk is not surprising. Each day the staffs of the Board of Governors,
the New York Fed, and the Treasury all make separate estimates of
Treasury balances based on knowledge of inflows and outflows from
the Treasury’s tax and loan accounts and knowledge of specific Treas-
ury financing operations being undertaken. Even with this extensive
knowledge, the three estimates of Treasury balances frequently differ
by large amounts. When this happens, a judgement is made in con-
ducting that day’s open market operations. It seems very unlikely
that Hamilton’s econometric model adequately accounts for the
nuances of the actual procedure used.
17 For a complete description of contemporaneous reserve accounting
post-1982, see Gilbert and Trebing (1982). The lag in the structure of
reserve requirements was increased in July 1998.
18 The Federal Reserve reverted to a system of lagged reserve accounting
in July 1998.
19 The reason is that the Fed cannot offset large unanticipated surpluses
or deficits in the aggregate provision because with rare exceptions,
since the early 1980s, the Desk has entered the market only once per
day. In January 1997 the Desk moved up the timing of its interventions
from 11:30 a.m. EST to 10:30 a.m.; in April 1999 the time was moved
to 9:30 a.m. to allow the Desk to intervene closer to the time that the
market for repurchase agreements is most liquid. It is interesting to
note that Furfine (2000) finds, with the exception of settlement
Wednesday, much of the intra-maintenance period variation in the
funds rate is the result of predictable patterns in the level and volatility
of interbank payments.
20 Given the sensitivity of least squares to outliers, it is very possible that
Hamilton’s results are due to large funds rate changes on a few days.
Hamilton reports no test of the sensitivity of his results to outliers
that occur on settlement days.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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Hamilton’s Empirical Methodology
To investigate the source of Hamilton’s 
settlement-day results, I estimate his model over an
extended sample period and I examine the results
for his sample period in more detail. Following
Hamilton, let yt denote the variable being studied
and xt and zt denote vectors of variables that govern
the mean and variance of yt, respectively. In general, 
(15) ,
where εt=σtvt and σt is assumed to depend on cur-
rent and lagged values of other variables, zt, and of
lagged values of vt. Hamilton chose the variables to
include in xt based on an analysis of institutional
factors and checked his specification using a variety
of specification tests.
In addition, vt is assumed to be drawn from 
a mixture of normal distributions. Specifically,
vt~N(0,1) with probability p and vt~N(0,τ
2) with
probability (1–p). Hamilton argues that this distri-
bution is useful for capturing very frequent small
changes and the occasional very large changes
observed in the funds rate and that it produces esti-
mates of β that are robust to the influence of outliers.
The variance of this distribution is
(16) .





assumes that the magnitude of σ
2
t obeys an EGARCH
model proposed by Nelson (1996). Specifically, 
(17)
.
After experiencing difficulty maximizing the likeli-
hood function with q(·)=|v|, Hamilton assumed
that
(18)
The function given by equation (18) is smooth
around zero, so that it is everywhere differentiable.
The conditional log likelihood function,
(19) ,
is maximized numerically subject to the constraint
that 0≤p≤1. The sequence {σt}
T
t=1 is generated
recursively using equation (19), starting with
ln(σ
2
0)=z′ 0κ and v0=0.
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Results from Hamilton’s Model
Hamilton investigated the behavior of Treasury
balances at the Fed, nonborrowed reserves, and the
federal funds rate using daily data over the period
April 6, 1989, to November 27, 1991. Hamilton’s
sample begins with the first Thursday in a new
maintenance period and ends on a settlement
Wednesday. The data used in this study also begin
on the first Thursday of a new maintenance period
and end on a settlement Wednesday. The sample
period, January 16, 1986, to January 29, 1997, in-
cludes Hamilton’s sample period.
Hamilton estimated various forms of this general
model for three variables: Treasury balances at the
Fed, Ut, nonborrowed reserves, NBRt, and changes
in the federal funds rate, ∆FFt. Hamilton’s measure
of nonborrowed reserves—deposit balances at the
Fed less total bank borrowing from the Fed—is un-
conventional. The measure used here—total reserves
less seasonal and adjustment borrowing—is used
by the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York to implement the FOMC’s policy direc-
tive. The equations are estimated over three non-
overlapping periods: January 16, 1986, to April 5,
1989; April 6, 1989, to November 27, 1991; and
November 29, 1991, to January 29, 1997.
Estimates of Hamilton’s model for Treasury
balances are presented in Table 1 for the three
sample periods. In addition to lagged values of the
dependent variable, xt includes a variety of dummy
variables that capture day-of-the-week, day-of-the-
year, and other special day effects (a list of these
variables is provided in the Appendix).
The estimates are identical to Hamilton’s for
his sample period. Over other sample periods, how-
ever, the results are somewhat different. There is
considerable variation for many of the parameters
across samples. Nevertheless, the estimates are
broadly consistent with two features of Hamilton’s
estimates: namely, (i) that the Treasury balances
converge fairly rapidly to the control level of $5
billion in normal circumstances and (ii) that they
follow a random walk when Treasury balances
exceed $8 billion. Moreover, summary statistics for
the forecast errors, reported in Table 2, suggest that
overall the model performs as well, or better, over
the periods before and after his. The in-sample root-
mean-squared error before and after Hamilton’s
period is smaller than for his sample period. The
same is true of the median forecast error.
The EGARCH model does not force the forecast66 JULY/AUGUST 2001
REVIEW
errors to be unbiased, and the average forecast error
for all three periods is significantly greater than zero.
The average forecast error is smaller for periods
before and after Hamilton’s, however. The forecast
errors, plotted in Figures 1 through 3, suggest that
there is no appreciable difference in the model’s
performance over the three periods. Furthermore,
Q-statistics at various horizons show no significant
serial correlation in the series during any of the
three sample periods.21
In Hamilton’s model the liquidity effect is given
by the estimated response of changes in the funds
rate to ε ˆU
t. Estimates of Hamilton’s funds rate equa-
tion are presented in Table 3.22 My estimates of the
funds rate equation for Hamilton’s sample period
are identical to his estimates. The liquidity effect is
large and statistically significant only on settlement
Wednesdays. On all other days, the response of the
funds rate to ε ˆU
t is small and, with the exception of
settlement Tuesday, not statistically significant. The
estimated liquidity effect is small and not statisti-
cally significant on settlement Wednesday during
the other sample periods. Indeed, the response of
the funds rate to unanticipated Treasury balances
on settlement Wednesday is perverse during the
third sample period. Hence, there is no evidence
of a liquidity effect using Hamilton’s model except
Figure 1





























NOTE: *Indicates settlement Wednesdays when the absolute
change in federal funds rate was greater than 0.80 and the
absolute value of the estimated treasurey residual was greater
than 1.85.
Figure 3











21 Little is gained from modeling the variance. Residuals obtained from
applying OLS estimates to the mean are very similar to those presented
in Figures 1 through 3. More important, none of the qualitative con-
clusions presented here are altered.
22 Hamilton’s nonborrowed reserve equation was also estimated. (For
brevity, the results are not reported here.) The results are very similar
to those reported by Hamilton. Indeed, the estimate of the coefficient
on U ˆ
t differs little from that reported by Hamilton despite the signifi-
cant difference in the measures used. Moreover, the estimate of the
coefficient on U ˆ
t was negative and statistically significant in all sam-
ples regardless of whether nonborrowed reserves or total reserves
were used. This is not surprising since unanticipated increases in
Treasury balances reduce both nonborrowed and total reserves.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
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during his sample period and then only on settle-
ment Wednesdays.
Hamilton’s Results Reconsidered
The analysis presented above suggests
Hamilton’s results could be due to a few days
when there were either unusually large forecast
errors or unusually large changes in the funds rate.
For the former explanation to be correct, it would
take a very large forecast error. Hamilton’s maximum
absolute forecast error is about $12 billion. All
other things the same, shocks of this magnitude
would produce about a $0.86 billion aggregate
reserve imbalance. Moreover, there were only eight
shocks that were more than $8 billion in magnitude.
Given the relative small size of these shocks, it seems
unlikely that Hamilton’s settlement day result is due
to unusually large settlement-Wednesday shocks.
To see whether Hamilton’s settlement-
Wednesday results could be due to days when there
Table 1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Model of U.S. Treasury Deposits (Dependent Variable
yt=Ut)
1/16/86–4/5/89 4/6/89–11/27/91 11/29/91–1/29/97
Parameter Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Constant 1.097 0.125 2.348 0.221 3.507 0.166
Ut–1 0.779 0.042 0.537 0.041 0.309 0.029
Ut–2 –0.135 0.045 –0.048 0.027 0.007 0.019
Ut–3 0.073 0.030 0.080 0.021 0.029 0.018
d1t –0.872 0.833 –3.640 0.706 –4.424 0.804
d1tUt–1 0.223 0.064 0.460 0.068 0.622 0.080
d1tζ1t –2.947 2.446 8.919 1.316 4.646 1.416
d1tζ1tUt–1 –0.045 0.177 –0.989 0.085 –0.735 0.111
d2t 0.801 0.252 0.674 0.235 1.193 0.127
d3t –0.286 0.082 –0.365 0.088 –0.068 0.057
γ4t 0.043 0.108 –0.458 0.128 –0.227 0.103
ζ3t –0.115 0.158 –0.321 0.160 0.099 0.141
ζ4t 0.370 0.150 0.614 0.174 0.147 0.121
ζt
n 0.030 0.142 0.942 0.369 0.607 0.195
Conditional variance parameters
Constant –0.372 0.128 –1.135 0.358 –0.937 0.117
d1t 0.629 0.317 0.894 0.312 1.253 0.253
d2t 0.972 0.292 1.327 0.263 0.552 0.238
d3t –0.030 0.137 –0.748 0.186 –0.298 0.131
ζt
n 0.122 0.361 2.031 0.322 1.193 0.226  
Other parameters
δ 0.864 0.039 0.948 0.023 0.710 0.083
α 0.239 0.058 0.087 0.036 0.096 0.049
  0.415 0.253 0.471 0.453 1.344 0.758
p 0.898 0.552 0.584 0.331 0.711 0.161
τ 3.128 0.392 2.565 0.288 2.851 0.157
NOTE: SE, standard error.68 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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were unusually large changes in the federal funds
rate, I identified settlement Wednesdays when the
funds rate changed by more than 80 basis points—
about two standard deviations of the daily change
in the funds rate over the entire sample period.
There were 10 settlement Wednesdays when the
funds rate changed by more than 80 basis points.
These dates are reported in Table 4, along with the
associated shock to the Treasury’s balance. On four
of these days, the shock to the Treasury’s balance
was smaller than one standard deviation. There were
just six settlement Wednesdays when the funds
rate changed by more than 80 basis points and the
shock to the Treasury’s balance was relatively large
(these observations are denoted with an asterisk in
Figure 2).
To test the sensitivity of the results to these
observations, settlement Wednesdays were parti-
tioned into these six settlement Wednesdays and
the remaining 63. Specifically, a dummy variable l
was created, where l=1 on these six days and l=0
elsewhere. The funds rate equation was reestimated
allowing for different level and slope effects. The
estimates, presented in Table 5, indicate that there
is a statistically significant level effect associated
with these six days. When this effect is accounted
for, the response of the funds rate to the shock to
Treasury balances is no different on these six days
than on the remaining 63 settlement Wednesdays
and is consistent with the results for the other sam-
ple periods. Moreover, in both cases the response is
statistically insignificant.
Three of these days (including two of the
seven largest one-day changes in the funds rate in
the sample period) came in the wake of the Fed’s
December 26, 1990, announcement that it was
reducing to zero the reserve requirement on time
and savings deposits. This action took banks by
surprise. As a consequence of this action, the federal
funds rate became more volatile and the federal
funds market did not settle down completely until
late March 1991.23
These results confirm what the analysis of the
reserve market suggested. The significant response
to a particular reserve supply shock on the last day
of the maintenance period is not due to the liquid-
ity effect. Rather, the significant settlement-day
response is due to a few settlement Wednesdays
when there were unusually large and transient
changes in the funds rate.24
AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF
INDENTIFYING THE LIQUIDITY EFFECT
The analysis of the preceding section showed
that it was impossible to estimate the liquidity effect
directly using daily data. It is possible, however, to
estimate the liquidity effect indirectly. If the Fed
moves the funds rate through open market opera-
tions, as is commonly assumed, there should be a
systematic relationship between changes in the
Fed’s funds rate target and nonborrowed reserves.
Specifically, the Fed should increase the supply of
reserves (relative to its expectation of demand) when
it lowers the funds rate target and reduce the supply
of reserves when the target is raised.
Hence, it is possible to estimate the liquidity
effect by estimating the change in nonborrowed
reserves associated with a change in the funds rate
target. This is done by estimating the reduced form
23 The standard deviation for the daily change in the funds rate from
December 26, 1990, to March 29, 1991, was 0.749 basis points, com-
pared with 0.350 for the rest of the period from January 2, 1986, to
January 31, 1997.
24 John Partlan suggested another reason why Hamilton’s results should
be fragile: namely, that shocks to Treasury balances are small relative
to other shocks. The total shock to nonborrowed reserves, ÛNBR, was
obtained by subtracting from nonborrowed reserves the BOG’s esti-
mate of reserve demand and open market operations of the Desk that
day. Regressing ÛNBR on the average forecast error of the Treasury’s
balance, FEt




avg is very close to and not significantly different
from its theoretical value of –1. Moreover, just as Partlan suggested,
R –2=0.0776, indicating that the error in the forecast of Treasury
balances accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total shocks
to nonborrowed reserves.
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Treasury Balance
Shocks
1/16/86– 4/6/8– 11/29/91–
Statistic 4/5/89 11/27/91 1/29/97
Mean 0.128 0.220 0.155
Median 0.009 0.037 0.006
Minimum –8.94 –12.41 –14.45
Maximum 7.60 12.39 12.83
SD 1.58 1.85 1.77
RMSE 1.59 1.87 1.78
No. of  809 666 1301
observations
NOTE: SD, standard deviation; RMSE, root-mean-squared
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Table 3
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Model of the Federal Funds Rate (Dependent Variable
yt=∆ ∆FFt)
1/16/86–4/5/89 4/6/89–11/27/91 11/29/91–1/29/97
Parameter Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
φ1t 0.025 0.012 0.004 0.008 –0.014 0.010
φ2t –0.029 0.009 –0.042 0.007 –0.081 0.007
φ3t 0.090 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.072 0.007
φ4t –0.061 0.009 –0.022 0.006 –0.067 0.006
φ5t –0.059 0.009 –0.022 0.006 –0.022 0.006
φ6t 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.026 0.006
φ7t –0.030 0.009 –0.035 0.006 –0.043 0.006
φ8t 0.098 0.011 0.030 0.008 0.115 0.009
φ9t –0.074 0.012 –0.004 0.008 –0.091 0.012
φ10t 0.097 0.029 0.125 0.036 0.172 0.021
φ1tε ˆt
U –0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005 –0.001 0.007
φ2tε ˆt
U –0.004 0.006 –0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
φ3tε ˆt
U 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.006
φ4tε ˆt
U 0.013 0.007 –0.003 0.004 –0.001 0.004
φ5tε ˆt
U 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004
φ6tε ˆt
U 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002
φ7tε ˆt
U –0.005 0.006 –0.005 0.006 0.001 0.006
φ8tε ˆt
U –0.002 0.009 –0.004 0.003 0.013 0.006
φ9tε ˆt
U 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.007
φ10tε ˆt
U 0.026 0.027 0.088 0.037 –0.016 0.013
d11t –0.021 0.035 –0.043 0.024 0.074 0.073
d12t –0.032 0.018 –0.005 0.015 –0.014 0.013
d13t 0.089 0.036 –0.005 0.023 0.129 0.036
d14t 0.198 0.021 0.116 0.028 0.238 0.019
d15tsp –0.770 0.031 –0.831 0.029 –0.648 0.033
Conditional variance parameters
φ1t –4.535 0.203 –5.831 0.245 –4.905 0.173
∑
7
j=2φjt –5.204 0.140 –6.211 0.167 –5.601 0.010
φ8t –4.734 0.207 –5.744 0.250 –4.599 0.169
φ9t –4.428 0.202 –5.644 0.229 –4.326 0.198
φ10t –2.702 0.204 –2.683 0.271 –3.120 0.166
d7t+d9t 1.533 0.635 0.944 0.469 1.877 0.436





d6t NA NA 3.050 0.701 NA NA
Other parameters
δ 0.847 0.031 0.688 0.068 0.433 0.053
α 0.351 0.049 0.637 0.071 0.504 0.047
  0.516 0.109 –0.050 0.063 0.335 0.068
p 0.882 0.422 0.773 0.221 0.821 0.198
τ 3.000 0.334 3.144 0.270 3.489 0.225
NOTE:
†Parameter constrained to this value; SE, standard error.70 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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for nonborrowed reserves, i.e., estimating the non-
borrowed reserves equation in equation (10). The
variables include the estimate of reserve demand
made by the staff of the Board of Governors, RD
e;
the estimate of excess reserve demand made by the
staff of the Board of Governors, ER
e; the average
forecast error made by the staffs of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, the Board of Governors,
and the Treasury in forecasting the Treasury’s bal-
ance at the Fed, FE
avg; the discount rate, DR; and the
federal funds rate target, FF
*.
There were two significant changes in reserve
requirements during the sample period. On
December 27, 1990, the reserve requirement on
non-personal time and savings deposits was reduced
from 3 percent to zero in two stages. On April 2,
1992, the reserve requirement on transactions
deposits was reduced from 12 percent to 10 percent.
Theoretically, the coefficient on RD
e is equal to τλ,
so it should change with changes in the type of
deposits that are reservable and with changes in
reserve requirements, assuming that demand for a
given type of reservable deposits is stable. Conse-
quently, RD
e is partitioned into the three periods
of different reserve requirements using dummy
variables RRi, i=1,2,3, that equal one when the ith
reserve structure is in place and zero otherwise.
It is important to note that the Fed does not
strictly adhere to operating procedure described by
Feinman (1993). Considerable judgement is involved.
Consequently, the estimated equation includes
variables that do not enter the reduced form obtained
from a strict interpretation of the operating proce-
dure. One variable is the spread between the funds
rate, and the funds rate target is lagged one day,
(FF–FF
*)t–1. There are several reasons why this
variable might be important. First, if the Fed wishes
to keep the funds rate close to the funds rate target,
it is reasonable to assume that the Desk attempts to
offset deviations of the funds rate from the target
on the previous day (Taylor, 2001). An alternative
explanation comes from noting that the Fed did not
explicitly state the level of its funds rate target until
August 1997. Consequently, the Desk could inject
reserves when the funds rate is above the target and
drain reserves when the funds rate is below the tar-
get to signal the level of the funds rate target to the
market. Yet a third possibility comes from noting
that under contemporaneous reserve accounting
there is considerable uncertainty about the demand
for reserves. In such instances the Desk may rely on
a signal from the federal funds rate (Meulendyke,
1998, p. 180).
For any or all of these reasons, reserves could
systematically increase when the funds rate is above
the funds rate target the previous day and decline
when the previous day’s funds rate is below the
target. Of course, this should not happen on days
when the Fed changes the funds rate target, so this
variable is included only on days when the funds
rate target is not changed.
In addition, I have elsewhere shown (Thornton,
2001a) that the Desk tends to offset changes in bor-
rowing. Hence, the spread between actual borrow-
ing and the borrowing assumption on the previous
day, (BR–BRAS)t–1, is also included. If the Desk off-
sets borrowing, the coefficient on this spread should
be negative and statistically significant. Finally, to
estimate the extent to which the Fed systematically
changes reserves when it changes the federal funds
rate target, the change in the funds rate target, ∆FF
*,
is included.
The sample period is from February 11, 1987,
to December 31, 1996. Beginning with its February
1994 meeting, the FOMC began announcing target
changes. Prior to that, most target changes occurred
during the intermeeting period.25 Target changes
have also been much less frequent since 1994 and
changes have always been multiples of 25 basis
25 Of the 63 target changes made prior to February 1994, only 10 were
made the day after regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. In contrast,
all but two target changes after 1994 were initiated at regularly
scheduled FOMC meetings. See Thornton (1996) for more details.
Table 4
Potential Influential Observations



















†Indicates settlement Wednesdays when |∆FFt|>0.80
and |ε ˆt
U|>1.85.points. It is possible that the Desk has controlled
the funds rate since 1994 through what Guthrie
and Wright (2000) call open mouth operations.26
Meulendyke (1998) and Hanes (1998) have also
suggested this possibility. In this case, the Fed need
only announce target changes and the market
adjusts to the new target level. Consequently, the
sample is partitioned into the periods February 11,
1987, to January 31, 1994, and February 1, 1994,
to December 31, 1996.
The Pre-1994 Results
Estimates of the nonborrowed reserves equa-
tion for the first period are reported in the first two
columns of Table 6. Not all of the estimates conform
to the structural model of the reserve market. For
example, neither the coefficient on the funds rate
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target nor the discount rate is correctly signed,
and neither is statistically significant. Likewise,
the coefficient on ER
e is incorrectly signed, but is
marginally significant at the 5 percent significance
level.
The estimated coefficients on RD
e over the
three partitions are positive and highly significant,
and these variables alone account for over 70 per-
cent of the variation in nonborrowed reserves over
the period. In contrast to what the theory would
suggest, however, the estimates do not vary with
changes in reserve requirements. Indeed, all three
estimates are close to unity and the hypotheses
that each is equal to unity, and that they are jointly
26 Guthrie and Wright (2000) develop this idea in response to an obser-































†Parameter constrained to this value; SE, standard error.
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equal, cannot be rejected. One reason that these
estimates differ from the theoretical values sug-
gested in equation (10) is the demand for reservable
deposits is not interest sensitive at the daily fre-
quency. Hence, the Desk is not necessarily estimat-
ing the demand for reserves consistent with the
funds rate target each day, but rather is trying to
accommodate reserve demand.27
As theory predicts, the estimated coefficient on
FE
avg is negative and highly significant. Nevertheless,
the estimate differs significantly from its theoretical
value of –1.28 One reason this coefficient differs
from its theoretical value is the weight that the Desk
gives to the three agency’s forecast changes over
time (for a discussion of this and other reasons, see
Thornton, 2001b).
Also, consistent with my analysis elsewhere
(Thornton, 2001a), the coefficient on (BR–BRAS)t–1
is negative and statistically significant. The Desk
appears to offset a significant proportion of devia-
tions of the previous day’s borrowing from the
assumed level.
The coefficient on (FF–FF
*)t–1 is positive and
statistically significant. Hence, the Desk systemati-
cally adds reserves when the funds rate is above the
target the previous day and drains when the previous
day’s funds rate is below the target. Unfortunately,
it is impossible to know whether the Desk is (i) try-
ing to keep the funds rate close to the funds rate
target (e.g., Taylor, 2001), (ii) trying to signal the level
of the funds rate target, or (iii) uncertain about
reserve demand.
The coefficient on ∆FFt
* is negative and statisti-
cally significant, indicating that the Desk systemat-
ically drains reserves when the funds rate target is
raised and adds reserves when the target is reduced.
The estimates indicate that the actions that the Desk
takes when the funds rate target is changed are mod-
27 The forecasts are updated as information on deposits comes in during
the maintenance period. For a description of the procedure see
Meulendyke (1998, Chap. 6).
28 If the residuals from Hamilton’s model are used, the estimated coeffi-
cient is about –0.4.
Table 6




Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE
Constant 2.144 1.841 2.352 1.836
FFt
* 0.059 0.162 0.028 0.162
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est, however. For example, the estimate suggests that
on average the Desk drains less than $1 billion from
reserves when the funds rate target is increased by
25 basis points. The relative magnitude of these
actions can be seen from noting that the standard
error for the nonborrowed reserves equation is about
$2.3 billion. Hence, random shocks to nonborrowed
reserves are nearly 2.5 times larger than the estimate
of the open market operation required to move the
equilibrium federal funds rate 25 basis points.
Moreover, the average absolute value of the
residual to the reserve equations is about $1.6
billion—nearly twice as large as the estimate of
the actions the Fed takes to change the funds rate
target by 25 basis points. The average absolute devi-
ation of the funds rate from the funds rate target
during this period was about 17 basis points. Hence,
shocks to reserves, which cause the funds rate to
deviate from the target by an average of about 17
basis points, are nearly twice as large as the open
market operations that are required to change the
equilibrium funds rate by 25 basis points.
Alternative Series of Funds Rate Target
Change
The estimated size of open market operations
might be small because ∆FF
* includes target changes
that were made to accommodate changes in reserve
demand. Such changes would not represent exoge-
nous changes in monetary policy. Recently, an
unofficial Board staff series of target changes that
reflect changes in monetary policy has been made
available (Thornton and Wheelock, 2000). This
federal funds rate target series, FF
**, differs from
the series used here prior to 1990 in that there are
fewer target changes and, in some cases, the target
changes differ in timing and/or magnitude.
In order to test whether the results are sensitive
to the funds rate target series used, the nonborrowed
reserve equation was reestimated using FF
**. The
results are presented in the last two columns of
Table 6. The response of nonborrowed reserves to
changes in the funds rate target is insensitive to the
funds rate target series used. In particular, the coef-
ficients on ∆FFt
** and (FF–FF
**)t–1 are nearly iden-
tical to those on ∆FFt
* and (FF–FF
*)t–1. Hence, the
relatively modest size of the estimates of Fed actions
cannot be attributed to a mixing of endogenous
and exogenous target changes.
The Post-1994 Results
It could be that open market operations are not
undertaken to move the equilibrium federal funds
rate, per se. Rather they are undertaken to signal a
change in the target and to signal the target level.
Meulendyke (1998, pp. 141-42) has suggested this
possibility, stating:
[A]chieving the degree of reserve pressures
specified in the directive has been inter-
preted since the late 1980s to mean creating
conditions consistent with the FOMC’s
desired Federal funds rate. That rate has
generally been apparent to the banks;
since 1994 it has been announced formally
and in prior years it was clearly indicated
through an open market operation. The rate
has tended to move to the new, preferred
level as soon as banks knew the intended
rate, with little or no change in the amount
of borrowing allowed for when constructing
the path for nonborrowed reserves.
For example, the Fed could signal the level of
the funds rate by injecting reserves when the funds
rate is above the target and by draining reserves
when the rate is below the target. On days when
the funds rate target is changed, the Desk injects
or drains a larger quantity of reserves to signal a
change in the funds rate target. Whether intended
or not, there is evidence that market analysts used
such information to make judgements that the funds
rate target had changed in the 1970s (Cook and
Hahn, 1989, and Thornton, 1999).
It would be unnecessary to signal target changes
after the Fed began announcing them in 1994.
Hence, to investigate the signaling hypothesis, the
nonborrowed reserve equation was estimated over
the period February 1, 1994, to December 31, 1996.
The estimates are presented in Table 7. During this
period, all but one target change occurred at regu-
larly scheduled FOMC meetings. The target changes
were announced the day the FOMC made the deci-
sion; but, because of the Desk’s practice of entering
the market once per day, these changes could not
be implemented in terms of open market operations
until the next day. Hence, changes in the target are
aligned to the first day that the Desk could have
implemented the FOMC’s decision.
The results over this period are broadly similar
to those over the previous period, even though non-
borrowed reserves trended down as banks instituted
sweep programs to avoid reserve requirements
29 A trend was included in the equation for this period. The coefficient
was negative but not statistically significant, so the results without
the trend are reported here.74 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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(e.g., Anderson and Rasche, 2000).29 The coefficients
on the funds rate target and the discount rate are
correctly signed but not statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. The coefficient on RD
e is again
very close to and not significantly different from
unity, suggesting that the Fed accommodated the
impact of sweep accounts on required reserves.
The coefficient on (BR–BRAS)t–1 is again positive
and significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient
on FE
avg is negative and significant and not signifi-
cantly different from its theoretically correct value
of –1.
The coefficient on ∆FF
* is smaller than for the
previous period and is insignificant. This result is
consistent with Meulendyke’s (1998) argument
that the Fed has controlled the funds rate though
open mouth operations since 1994. Once the Fed
began announcing target changes there was no rea-
son to signal them through open market operations.
After 1994 all funds rate target changes were
multiples of 25 basis points. Consequently, the mar-
ket should have had less difficulty determining the
level of the funds rate target. If the Fed is systemati-
cally responding to the difference between the funds
rate and the funds rate target on the previous day
in order to signal the level of the funds rate target,
one might expect the Desk to take smaller, and
perhaps less frequent, actions after 1994. Consis-
tent with that interpretation, the coefficient on
(FF–FF
*)t–1 is much smaller after 1994.
It is unlikely that the Fed controlled the funds
rate through open mouth operations prior to 1994
and even less likely prior to 1990. In order for
open mouth operations to work the market must
know the level of the funds rate target. Elsewhere
(Thornton, 1999) I argue that the market was un-
aware that the Fed was targeting the federal funds
rate because the Fed told the public that it was tar-
geting borrowed reserves. I also present statistical
and documentary evidence consistent with the
market being unaware that the Fed was targeting
the funds rate until late 1990. If the market was
Table 8
Estimate of the Nonborrowed Reserves
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unaware that the Fed was targeting the funds rate,
the Fed could not have controlled the funds rate
through open mouth operations. While the market
was aware that the Fed was targeting the funds
rate after 1990, changes in the target were not
announced. Consequently, if the Fed was using
open market operations to signal target changes, it
would have no need to do so until after 1990.
To further investigate this possibility, the non-
borrowed reserves equation was estimated partition-
ing ∆FF
* and (FF–FF
*)t–1 into periods before and
after November 30, 1990, using a dummy variable,
DB90 (that equals one before December 1, 1990, and
zero otherwise) and a dummy variable, DA90 (that
is equal to one after November 30, 1990, and zero
otherwise). These estimates are presented in
Table 8.30
Estimates of the coefficients on ∆FF
* differ
significantly over the two samples. The coefficient
is statistically significant before December 1990 but
not after, which is inconsistent with the signaling
hypothesis. It is more consistent with the hypoth-
esis that the Fed was trying to move the funds rate
through open market operations. While the coeffi-
cient before 1990 is about 40 percent larger than
that over the entire sample period, the estimate is
still small relative to the standard error of nonbor-
rowed reserves. Moreover, the relatively small
and insignificant coefficient after 1990 is incon-
sistent with either the open market or open mouth
alternatives.
In contrast to the marked difference in the
estimates of the coefficients on ∆FF
*, the coefficients
on (FF–FF
*)t–1 are statistically significant and
nearly identical. Indeed, the null hypothesis that
they are equal cannot be rejected. Reconciling
these estimates is difficult. It could be that the sig-
nificant coefficient on (FF–FF
*)t–1 arises because
of uncertainty with the Desk’s estimates of reserve
demand, as Meulendyke (1998) and others have
suggested. If this explanation accounts for the sig-
nificant relationship between nonborrowed reserves
and (FF–FF
*)t–1, why did the relationship weaken
after 1994?
Is There a Liquidity Effect at the Daily
Frequency?
The evidence presented here suggests that there
may not be a liquidity effect at the daily frequency.
While the evidence is that the Fed systematically
adjusted nonborrowed reserves in a manner that is
consistent with moving the equilibrium funds rate,
it did so only before December 1990. After 1990
there is no statistically significant systematic rela-
tionship between changes in nonborrowed reserves
and changes in the Fed’s target for the federal funds
rate. Moreover, and equally important, the magni-
tude of the Fed actions are relatively small even
before 1990. It is difficult to see how such relatively
small actions could account for relatively large
changes in the equilibrium federal funds rate. These
results are consistent with evidence (Thornton,
1999, and Poole and Rasche, 2000) that indicates
no statistically significant response of the funds
rate to changes in the funds rate target. It is also
broadly consistent with evidence on the dynamic
relationship between the federal funds rate and the
3-month T-bill rate (Sarno and Thornton, 2000).
The evidence is broadly consistent with the
suggestion by some that the Fed controls the funds
rate through open mouth operations. According to
this view, all the Fed need do is announce or signal
the target change and the market does the rest. It
is easy to see how open mouth operations could
account for the lack of policy actions after 1994,
when the Fed began announcing target changes.
It is much more difficult to see how open mouth
operations could work very effectively before 1994.
While the Fed was open about the fact that it was
targeting the funds rate after 1990, target changes
were not announced. Consequently, the Fed would
have had an incentive to signal target changes with
open market operations during the 1990-94 period.
The evidence indicates that there is no signifi-
cant relationship between these variables after 1990.
Hence, the lack of a statistically significant system-
atic relationship between nonborrowed reserves
and changes in the funds rate target after 1994
cannot be taken as strong support for the open
mouth hypothesis. Hence it is impossible to con-
clude that the Fed has controlled the funds rate
through open mouth alternatives on the basis of
the evidence presented here.
Nevertheless, the lack of systematic relationship
between nonborrowed reserves and changes in the
Fed’s funds rate target after 1990 and the relatively
small estimated size of the systematic response
before 1990 suggest that the Fed has not imple-
mented target changes through open market oper-
ations. Hence, the evidence presented here is
inconsistent with the conventional story of how the
30 These results are also insensitive to the target series used.76 JULY/AUGUST 2001
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Fed controls the funds rate through open market
operations. 
Finally, there is strong evidence that the Fed
responds significantly to the previous day’s deviation
of the funds rate from the funds rate target. What
is less clear is why the Fed responds significantly.
The explanation that the Fed does this to keep the
funds rate close to the target level would appear to
be inconsistent with the evidence that the Fed does
not implement target changes through open market
operations. The explanation that the Fed does this
to signal the target level would appear to be at odds
with the fact that before 1990 the Fed was officially
implementing monetary policy with a borrowed
reserves operating procedure and with evidence
presented elsewhere (Thornton, 1999) that the
market was unaware that the Fed was directly target-
ing the funds rate until after late 1990. The evidence
is consistent with the Desk using information from
the funds rate when it is uncertain of its estimates
of reserve demand (Meulendyke, 1998). The remain-
ing issue is why the response became smaller after
1994.
CONCLUSIONS
Following up on work by Hamilton (1997), this
paper investigates whether the liquidity effect can
be identified using daily data. In so doing I derive a
structural model of the reserve market based on the
Fed’s operating procedure. An analysis of this model
shows why the liquidity effect cannot be estimated
using Hamilton’s methodology. Consistent with
this conclusion, I show that there is no evidence of
a statistically significant liquidity effect using
Hamilton’s methodology for periods before and
after his and that the liquidity effect which he finds
on settlement Wednesdays is due to a few days when
there were unusually large changes in the funds
rate. When these days are accounted for, there is no
evidence of the liquidity effect during Hamilton’s
sample period.
Estimates of the reduced form of the structural
model of the reserve market provide little support
for the conventional view that the Fed controls the
funds rate using open market operations, i.e., the
liquidity effect. At times the Fed has conducted open
market operations in a manner consistent with its
operating objective. The size of these operations
appears to be so small that they cannot account for
changes in the equilibrium funds rate. The relation-
ship between Fed actions, the funds rate, and the
funds rate target appears to be much more compli-
cated than is usually thought and more analysis
will be required to understand it.
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Appendix
Discrete Variables Used in Estimating Hamilton’s Model
Variable Description
γjt 1 if t falls in month j for j=1,2,…,12 and 0 otherwise
ζjt 1 if t falls on business day j of the month for j=1,2,…,23 and otherwise
ζt
n 1 if t falls on the last business day of the month and 0 otherwise
φjt 1 if t falls on day j of a reserve maintenance period for j=1,2,…,10 and 0 otherwise
sp Spread of volume weighted average of federal funds rate from (t–1) to (t–3)
l 1 if day t is one of six days when |∆FFt|>0.80 and |ε ˆt
U|>1.85 and 0 otherwise
ε ˆt
U Estimated residual from model of U.S. Treasury deposits
d1t 1 if Ut–1>8 and 0 otherwise
d2t 1 if t falls on a major tax-collection day (month is January, April, June or September and t comes 
after the first Monday following the 15th) and 0 otherwise
d3t 1 if t falls on a Friday and 0 otherwise
d6t 1 if 10 January 1991≤t≤6 February 1991 and 0 otherwise
d7t 1 if t is last day of quarter 1, 2, or 3 and 0 otherwise
d8t 1 if t is the day before, the day of, or the day after the last day of quarter 1, 2, or 3 and 0 otherwise
d9t 1 if t is the last day of the year and 0 otherwise
d10t 1 if t is two days before, the day before, the day of, the day after, or two days after the last day of 
the year and 0 otherwise
d11t 1 if t precedes a one-day holiday and 0 otherwise
d12t 1 if t precedes a three-day holiday and 0 otherwise
d13t 1 if t follows a one-day holiday and 0 otherwise
d14t 1 if t follows a three-day holiday and 0 otherwise
d15t 1 if t is the first day of a new maintenance period or the first day of a new quarter and 0 otherwise